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Trouble at the Labour (West Midlands) 
Corral? Preliminary Election Musings 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director, Centre for Brexit Studies 
Yesterday’s “announcement” by Nigel Farage that the Brexit Party 
would not be standing candidates in the 317 seats won by the 
Conservative Party in the 2017 General Election should have 
surprised no-one. 
For as Farage himself stated in pointing out the bleeding obvious, to 
field candidates against sitting Tory MPs would risk splitting the leave 
vote and “usher in dozens of Liberal Democrat MPs” and therefore the 
increased prospect of another (“second”) referendum on EU 
membership.[1] 
Farage went on to state that the Brexit Party would “concentrate our 
total effort into all the seats that are held by the Labour party”[2]. But 
what are Labour’s overall chances in the upcoming Election on 
December 12th? 
In seeking to answer this, I will focus this article on the West 
Midlands, where much of the campaigning effort of the Tories and the 
Brexit Party will be focussed, in the hope that they can pick up a swag 
of Labour-held seats. 
The starting point of course has to be the current poll predictions as to 
the likely outcome of the election. Most polls predict a Conservative 
majority post-election; premised on likely gains in the Midlands and 
North of England, from Labour. 
YouGov, for example, recently commissioned fieldwork (conducted 
between the 7th October – 4th November) to look at voting intention by 
region[3], the results of which are reproduced below. 
Regional Voting Intention (%, figures in parentheses related to 
2017 vote share) 
 
Source: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-
reports/2019/11/08/regional-voting-intentions-show-both-main-parties- 
*Figures in parentheses refer to UKIP 2017 election vote share. 
Evident from this table is that the predicted vote share for both major 
parties is less than that achieved, and that Labour appear to be 
particularly suffering in this regard, with pro-remain voters migrating to 
the Lib Dems, Greens or SNP (in Scotland). 
To the extent that the Brexit Party appear to be making inroads, it is 
difficult to tell whether this is more at the expense of Labour or the 
Tories. However, at face value, these figures (and other polling 
figures) don’t look good for Labour. 
Very simply put, if the “Remain” vote splits in the manner suggested 
above, then it is all but certain that the Conservatives will gain an 
overall majority in the next Parliament, with Martin Baxter at Electoral 
Calculus currently predicting an overall Tory majority of 114.[4] 
The Midlands (and West Midlands in particular) look especially 
promising for the Tories, with a number of Labour marginal seats 
looking highly vulnerable. This is reproduced in the table below (I 
define “marginal” here as a majority of less than 5,000). 
West Midlands: Marginal Seats (2017 Election result) 
 
Source: House of Commons Library[5] 
At face value, the Tories could easily pick up 9 seats from Labour in 
the West Midlands, with Dudley North and Newcastle-Under-Lyme 
looking all but lost and 7 others “at risk”. 
Even seats such as Wolverhampton North East and Birmingham 
Northfield (where the former MG Rover factory was) come into play 
here. 
However, before we rush headlong into embracing such a prediction, 
let’s consider some mitigating factors. As the 2017 election result 
demonstrated, polling methodologies need to be interpreted with 
caution. 
As the above figures for the West Midlands attest, turnout is critical, 
as “none-of-the-above” typically “wins” most elections. 
Most non-voters would not choose to vote in the same pattern as 
actual voters. They typically more left-wing, younger, more mobile, 
more likely to rent a home etc. Youth turnout, student turnout and 
turnout amongst less-educated individuals is particularly hard to 
model. 
If such groups are mobilised by Labour (as in 2017) then this could 
serve to increase the Labour vote share significantly beyond that 
predicted. The recent surge of new electoral registrations amongst 
young people[6] suggests that this could be occurring. 
Where will people vote? Differential turnout across constituencies is 
particularly hard to model, so if the predicted gains in vote share 
largely fall in seats already won by the Tories (e.g., Stoke-on-Trent 
South, Walsall North, Dudley South, Nuneaton) then that would nullify 
a gain in vote share translating to an increase in seats. 
Additionally, getting hold of a representative sample is hard, and 
people who choose to answer questions are often more politically 
motivated than most. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, people do change their minds! 
The different parties have different strengths and we don’t know how 
that will play out. 
There is lots of money on the “Leave” side, and considerable technical 
expertise in terms of targeting via social media etc. (potent in part 
because of a willingness to cut corners in terms of factual accuracy). 
Labour, in contrast, have a very strong grassroots campaign, with 
vastly more members willing to be “boots on the ground”, and the 
ability to bus a number of passionate supporters quickly into key 
seats. This considerable organising ability, as shown in 2017, could 
make a difference. 
So, with Leader debates and another month of campaigning, there is 
much for all Parties to play for. The show-down at the West Midlands 
Corral is well and truly on. 
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